Darin Hauman v. Secretary PA Dept Corr by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-4-2011 
Darin Hauman v. Secretary PA Dept Corr 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"Darin Hauman v. Secretary PA Dept Corr" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 1520. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/1520 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 09-4038 
 ___________ 
 
 DARIN LEE HAUMAN, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 *SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT 
OF CORRECTIONS; FREDERICK ROSEMEYER,  
Superintendent; FRED A. BEERS, Fire and Safety  
Manager of SCI-LH; GAIL BEERS, Mail Room  
Supervisor of SCI-LH; DAN BUCK, Boiler Plant  
Manager of SCI-LH; JOE HILLEGAS, Heating, Ventilation  
and Air Conditioning Instructor of SCI-LH; MARDIANN  
HUNSBERGER, Superintendent, SCI-LH; JAMES  
KREUTZBERGER, Facility Maintenance Manager of SCI-LH;  
JAMES PHILLIPPI, Education Department Head of SCI-LH 
 
(*Pursuant to Rule 43©, Fed. R. App. P.) 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 05-cv-00439) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 25, 2011 
 
 Before:  FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: April 4, 2011) 
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 Darin Lee Hauman appeals from the final order of the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania concerning his civil rights complaint.  The 
proceedings in this matter have been lengthy.  Because the parties are familiar with the 
background, we will present only a summary.  In 2005, Hauman commenced a pro se 
civil rights action against several prison officials and employees at SCI-Laurel Highlands 
(“the prison”) at Somerset, Pennsylvania, where Hauman is an inmate.  He alleged that 
the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by exposing him to various 
environmental dangers, including toxic coal smoke emitted from the prison’s coal-fired 
boiler plant that infiltrates the prison’s indoor air, environmental or second hand tobacco 
smoke (“ETS”) from prisoners who smoke on prison grounds, and friable asbestos 
stemming from exposure on a work assignment where asbestos was present and disturbed 
in his presence.
1
  Hauman contended that on numerous dates, especially in 2005, he 
suffered shortness of breath and dizziness, and that his health has been negatively 
affected by the prison environment.  Hauman sought compensatory and punitive 
damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. 
 Hauman filed a motion for appointment of counsel, which was denied without 
discussion.  The case proceeded to discovery.  Hauman filed several unsuccessful 
discovery-related motions, including a motion to compel.  The Magistrate Judge denied 
the motion without discussion.  Hauman appealed the order to the District Court, and the 
                                                 
1
 Hauman also listed other environmental dangers in his complaint.  He also raised First 
Amendment violations. 
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District Court reversed the ruling as it pertained to Hauman’s requested discovery of his 
medical records.  The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and responses.  
In February 2008, the Magistrate Judge issued a report and recommendation that 
summary judgment be granted in the defendants’ favor on all claims except for the claim 
for injunctive relief based on the allegations of deliberate indifference to exposure to 
friable asbestos.  Hauman filed objections.  By order entered March 26, 2008, the District 
Court adopted the report and recommendation and granted summary judgment to the 
defendants except for the single claim for injunctive relief; that claim was set to proceed 
to a non-jury trial. 
 Hauman then sought leave to file an amended complaint to commence a class 
action and again sought the appointment of counsel.  The Magistrate Judge denied these 
motions.  In April 2008, Hauman filed a motion to appoint an expert for his remaining 
claim for injunctive relief on the friable asbestos claim, which the Magistrate Judge 
denied.  On appeal of that denial, the District Court remanded the issue for consideration 
under Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  The Magistrate Judge again denied the 
motion, and the District Court affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion by the Magistrate 
Judge.  In the interim, Hauman also filed objections to the denial of his counsel motion, 
and the District Court ruled that the Magistrate Judge’s order was not clearly erroneous.  
Hauman filed a third counsel motion, which again was denied without discussion but 
with direction to the Clerk of the District Court to mark any subsequent counsel motions 
as denied upon receipt. 
 The Magistrate Judge then conducted a site visit to the prison with the parties.  
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After that visit, on September 3, 2009, the Magistrate Judge issued a report and 
recommendation that judgment be entered in Hauman’s favor on his remaining claim for 
injunctive relief.  The Magistrate Judge noted that the only remaining issue for trial 
would be whether Hauman could prove exposure to asbestos and whether the defendants 
were deliberately indifferent to any need for medical monitoring, and that the defendants 
had advised during the site visit that they were willing to place Hauman in the same 
medical monitoring program used for the individuals who were potentially affected by a 
documented release of friable asbestos at the prison in April 2006.  But the Magistrate 
Judge reasoned that the proposed relief remedied any possible claim for injunctive relief.  
Hauman filed objections.  The District Court adopted the report and recommendation and 
entered judgment in Hauman’s favor on the remaining claim for injunctive relief, 
directing that Hauman be included in the same medical monitoring program used by the 
Department of Corrections for monitoring individuals exposed to friable asbestos.  In its 
order, the District Court noted that its order of injunctive relief was enforceable against 
the defendants.  The District Court later denied Hauman’s motion to alter or amend the 
order. 
 This appeal followed.  We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 and exercise plenary review over the District Court=s decision to grant summary 
judgment.  McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005).  Summary judgment 
is appropriate when the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (amended Dec. 1, 2010).  A court reviewing a summary judgment 
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motion must evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and 
draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.  Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. 
Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 330 (3d Cir. 1995).  However, a party opposing summary judgment 
“must present more than just bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions to 
show the existence of a genuine issue.”  Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 594 
(3d Cir. 2005) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 Hauman’s appeal focuses on his Eighth Amendment claims with respect to 
exposure to coal smoke, ETS, and asbestos.  At issue is whether the defendants knew of 
and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to Hauman.  See Farmer v. Brennan, 
511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).  We first turn to the District Court’s entry of judgment on 
Hauman’s claims for damages.  The record includes the documentation of Hauman’s 
respiratory condition during the relevant period.  Not noted in the Magistrate Judge’s 
report, but conceded by the defendants in their motion for summary judgment, was that 
the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a notice of violation 
based on particulate matter emissions from the prison’s coal-fired boiler plant, and that 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania paid a civil penalty in settlement of this violation of 
the Clean Air Act.  The defendants also acknowledged that asbestos or asbestos-
containing materials are present at the prison, and that there was an incident in April 2006 
involving a release of friable asbestos, though Hauman does not allege that he was 
directly exposed during that particular event.
2
  Hauman responded to the defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment with affidavits and additional supporting evidence of his 
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 Hauman claims that he was potentially harmed when the inmates directly involved in 
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respiratory ailments and diagnoses. 
 The Magistrate Judge considered the evidence and stated that, accepting the 
evidence in the light most favorable to Hauman, a reasonable fact finder would have 
insufficient evidence to determine whether Hauman was or was not directly exposed to 
friable asbestos during the May 2005 work assignment or by second-hand contact after 
the April 2006 release of friable asbestos.  However, the Magistrate Judge recommended 
that summary judgment be granted in the defendants’ favor based on the lack of expert 
evidence to show that Hauman’s respiratory conditions were caused by or were 
aggravated by any of the environmental conditions of the prison, and that Hauman’s lack 
of expert proof is fatal to his ability to prevail at trial.  We are troubled by this result, 
given that the Magistrate Judge had earlier denied Hauman’s motion for appointment of 
counsel without comment and without acknowledging any need for expert evidence.  See 
Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 504-05 (3d Cir. 2002).  As we stated in 
Montgomery, although appointed counsel might still have difficulty in obtaining and 
affording an expert, counsel would have much better opportunity to do so than would an 
indigent prisoner.  See id. at 505.  The Magistrate Judge anticipated an objection 
regarding the lack of expert evidence (and Hauman did indeed object on this basis), and 
so the Magistrate Judge noted that the court had no authority to appoint an expert on 
Hauman’s behalf.  (Feb. 22, 2008 Report and Recommendation at 8 n.3, citing Boring v. 
Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468, 474 (3d Cir. 1987).)  In addition, the Magistrate Judge noted 
that Federal Rule of Evidence 706 allows a court to appoint its own impartial expert, but 
                                                                                                                                                             
the April 2006 event returned to the housing unit, bringing the asbestos fibers with them. 
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not to appoint an expert on Hauman’s behalf.  One could infer from the Magistrate 
Judge’s report, and from his later orders in the case, that he would never entertain a 
party’s motion for appointment of a court-appointed expert under Rule 706 because such 
an appointment, in his view, always would be viewed as an abdication from his role as a 
neutral tribunal.  (See id., Sept. 16, 2008 order, Oct. 3, 2008 order.)  However, the rule 
itself contemplates that a court may appoint an expert on its own motion or on the motion 
of any party.  Viewing the Magistrate Judge’s analysis in the context of the proceedings 
in this case,
 3
 it would seem that no indigent pro se prisoner with a similar claim could 
ever defeat a summary judgment motion. 
 The Magistrate Judge also determined that the defendants were entitled to 
summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.  Specifically, the Magistrate 
Judge concluded that Hauman failed to overcome a qualified immunity defense because 
he produced no evidence that the defendants knowingly or recklessly exposed him to 
dangerous levels of asbestos.
4
  As Hauman argues in his brief, it is the defendants’ 
burden to establish their entitlement to qualified immunity.  See Oatess v. Sobolevitch, 
914 F.2d 428, 431 n.8 (3d Cir. 1990) (discussing qualified immunity as an affirmative 
defense that a defendant must plead and prove, not for a plaintiff to disprove, in the 
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  As we noted earlier, the Magistrate Judge denied Hauman’s counsel motion at the 
outset, without consideration of the factors under Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155-58 
(3d Cir. 1993).  The record reflects that Hauman may have encountered difficulty in 
obtaining the discovery necessary to his case.  For example, he succeeded in obtaining 
access to his own medical records only after intervention by the District Court.  Even 
after Hauman’s claim for injunctive relief survived summary judgment, the Magistrate 
Judge entered an order preemptively denying any further counsel motions by Hauman. 
4
 The Magistrate Judge discussed qualified immunity concerning Hauman’s asbestos 
claim, but also appears to have applied the same reasoning to the other environmental 
8 
 
context of a dismissal prior to service).  The defendants here did not seek summary 
judgment on that basis.  To the extent that the Magistrate Judge placed the burden on 
Hauman to disprove the availability of qualified immunity, the burden was unfairly 
placed. 
 We add that Hauman raises several arguments that pertain to the District Court’s 
order entering judgment in his favor on his claim for injunctive relief.  We do not address 
this order because Hauman received a favorable disposition and therefore is not 
“aggrieved” in such a way that the order is appealable by him.  See, e.g., Solar Turbines 
Inc. v. Seif, 879 F.2d 1073, 1078 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989); Watson v. City of Newark, 746 F.2d 
1008, 1010-11 (3d Cir. 1984). 
  For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s March 26, 2008 
order to the extent that it granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and will 
remand the matter for further proceedings. 
                                                                                                                                                             
claims. 
